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Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief 
is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s 
evidence.  These are examples of what I’ll call “epistemic discourse.”  Here I’ll propose 
and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.”  In 
particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativism is superior to its main rival, expressivism 
about epistemic discourse.  Expressivism and convention-relativism both jibe with anti-
realism about epistemic normativity, which is motivated by appeal to philosophical 
naturalism (§1).  Convention-relativism says that epistemic discourse describes how 
things stands relative to a conventional set of “epistemic” values; such discourse is akin 
to criticism relative to the conventional rules of a club (§2).  I defend convention-
relativism by appeal to a “reverse open question argument,” which says, pace 
expressivism, that epistemic discourse leaves normative questions open (§3). 
My three examples of epistemic discourse (above) represent three species of epistemic 
discourse: (i) attributions of the property of being an epistemic virtue, or “epistemic 
virtue attributions,” for short, (ii) attributions of the property of having epistemic value, 
or “epistemic value attributions,” for short, and (iii) attributions of epistemic obligation.1  
Epistemic virtue attributions and epistemic value attributions are species of epistemic 
evaluation; epistemic obligation attributions can be understood as non-evaluative. 
Epistemic discourse seems normative.  I’ll appeal to a more precise criterion of the 
normativity of discourse, below (§3.1), but the following will suffice to motivate the idea 
that epistemic discourse seems normative.  To say that openmindedness is an epistemic 
virtue seems to be to say that openmindedness really is a virtue, i.e. that it is good or 
desirable or admirable to be openminded; to say that true belief is epistemically valuable 
seems to be to say that true belief really is valuable, i.e. that true belief is good or worthy 
of pursuit or approbation; to say that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence 
seems to be to say that one really ought to cleave to one’s evidence, i.e. that one would 
(or at least could) deserve blame or censure or sanction for not so cleaving.  As Christine 
Korsgaard (1996) puts it, “[c]oncepts like knowledge, beauty, and meaning, as well as 
virtue and justice, all have a normative dimension, for they tell us what to think, what to 
like, what to say, what to do, and what to be.” (p. 9) Epistemic discourse seems 
normative in (at least something like) the same way.      
1 Naturalism and anti-realism about epistemic discourse  
                                                 
1 I have left attributions of knowledge off the list, as they raise some complex issues that 
are orthogonal to our main topic.  First, some knowledge attributions do not even appear 
to be normative.  Second, the thesis of “pragmatic encroachment” threatens the idea that 
knowledge attributions are a species of epistemic discourse.  I have also left attributions of 
epistemic reasons off the list.  It seems to me that either (i) epistemic reasons entail 
epistemic obligations, in which case what I say about epistemic obligation attributions 
can be said about epistemic reasons attributions, or (ii) epistemic reasons derive from 
epistemic values, in which case what I say about epistemic value attributions can be said 
about epistemic reasons attributions.    
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Engaging in epistemic discourse also seems to commit one to the existence of epistemic 
virtue, epistemic value, and epistemic obligations.  Do these things really exist?   This is 
the question of realism and anti-realism about epistemic normativity.  There are a 
number of ways to articulate the realism/anti-realism distinction (alternatively: a number 
of realism/anti-realism distinctions); here we shall understand realism about x as a thesis 
about the explanatory connection between x and the appropriateness of a certain species 
of discourse.  We shall understand realism about epistemic normativity as follows: 
Realism about epistemic normativity: The appropriateness of 
epistemic discourse is explained by the existence of epistemic virtue, 
epistemic value, and epistemic obligations.   
The negation of realism about epistemic normativity is anti-realism about epistemic 
normativity.   
Realism and anti-realism are metaphysical views, about the explanatory relationship (if 
there is one) between epistemic value (for example) and the appropriateness of epistemic 
value attributions.  If you think that there is no such thing as epistemic value, then you 
are an anti-realist of the most straightforward kind.  But if you think that epistemic value 
exists because it is appropriate for us to engage in the attribution of epistemic value, 
perhaps because you think that what it is for something to be valuable is for people to 
consistently value it (e.g. Williams 2002, p. 91-2), then you are also an anti-realist, 
although of a less straightforward kind.  Distinct from this metaphysical question are 
related questions about the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic discourse.  The realist 
is in a position to give a descriptivist account of the semantics of epistemic discourse, 
which jibes with her view about the explanatory relationship between (again, for 
example) epistemic value and the appropriateness of attributions of epistemic value.  The 
appropriateness of uttering “True belief is epistemically valuable,” when it is appropriate, 
will be explained, in part, by the fact that the sentence is true, and the truth of the 
sentence will be explained by the fact that true belief is epistemically valuable.  The anti-
realist will need to offer an alternative account. 
Although our focus will be on epistemic discourse, a semantics for epistemic discourse will 
naturally apply, mutatis mutandis, to its analogue in thought.  If we can explain (again, for 
example) what sentences of the form <x is epistemically valuable> mean, i.e. if we can 
give an account of the content of such sentences, then we should be in a position to 
explain the content of people’s thoughts when they think that something is epistemically 
valuable.   
The basic argument for anti-realism about epistemic discourse (cf. Hazlett 2013, Part II) 
appeals to philosophical naturalism, and is based on three premises: 
1. Given philosophical naturalism, we have pro tanto reason to avoid positing 
categorical normativity (cf. Kelly 2003, pp. 614-18; see also Papineau 1999, pp. 
17-18, Drier 2001, pp. 29-30, Owens 2003, pp. 283-4, Steglich-Petersen 2006, p. 
500). 
2. Teleological accounts of epistemic normativity, on which epistemic normativity is 
a species of (naturalistically kosher) instrumental normativity, fail (Kelly 2003, 
Owens 2003, Grimm 2008, 2009). 
3. Epistemic normativity is either categorical or instrumental.   
Given these three premises, and some natural assumptions (including that the naturalist’s 
pro tanto reason to avoid positing categorical normativity isn’t trumped in this case), 
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anti-realism can be defended.  Premise (1) speaks against realist accounts of epistemic 
normativity that explain the existence of epistemic value or epistemic reasons by appeal 
to the normativity of belief (Wedgwood 2002, Shah 2003, Shah and Velleman 2005, 
Boghossian 2003, 2005, Lynch 2009a, 2009b).  (The normativity in question is called 
“categorical” because it applies regardless of the desires or intentions of the believer.)  
Premise (2) rules out realist versions of the familiar epistemological idea that the 
existence of epistemic value or epistemic reasons can be understood by appeal to a “truth 
goal” (Foley 1987, 1993, Goldman 1999, Sosa 2003, 2007, 2009, Steglich-Petersen 2006, 
2009, 2011, Greco 2010).  Premise (3) says that these are the only realist games in town.  
The anti-realist concludes that realism is false.  There is obviously much to be said about 
this argument, but here I will assume anti-realism about epistemic normativity, since this 
is common ground between me (§2.2) and my expressivist interlocutors (§2.1) 
2 Articulating convention-relativism 
In recent years, anti-realists about epistemic normativity have defended expressivist 
accounts of epistemic discourse (Gibbard 1990, 2003, pp. 227-9, Chrisman 2007, Field 
2009, Kappel 2010), on which epistemic discourse is understood as expressive of non-
cognitive attitudes of endorsement, acceptance, approval, or valuation.  Their critics have 
been realists about epistemic normativity (Cuneo 2007, Lynch 2009a, 2009b, Shah 2010).  
I will articulate and defend an alternative to both expressivism about epistemic discourse 
and realism about epistemic normativity.  My proposed view is consistent with anti-
realism about epistemic normativity, but maintains that epistemic discourse is not 
(always) expressive of non-cognitive attitudes (cf. Fumerton 2001, Sosa 2007).  In this 
section I’ll describe expressivism about epistemic discourse (§2.1) and then articulate my 
proposed alternative, “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse” (§2.2). 
2.1 Expressivism about epistemic discourse 
The leading idea behind expressivism about epistemic discourse is that epistemic 
discourse is essentially (though not necessarily exclusively) expressive of certain non-
cognitive attitudes of endorsement, acceptance, approval, or valuation.2  Allan Gibbard 
(1990) defends and elaborates the view that “to call something rational is not … to 
attribute a property to it,” but rather “to express a state of mind.” (p. 9) In particular, “to 
think something rational is to accept norms that permit it.” (p. 46) The relevant non-
cognitive attitude here is accepting a norm.  Gibbard’s account applies equally to actions, 
feelings, and beliefs, so to think a belief is rational is (among other things) to accept 
norms that permit it, and to say that a belief is rational is (among other things) to express 
such acceptance.  Gibbard (2003, pp. 227-9) has also argued that to think that S knows 
that p is to plan to rely on S’s judgment about whether p, and thus to say that S knows 
that p is to express such planning.  The relevant non-cognitive attitude in this case is 
planning.  “Coherence and agreement on the plain facts doesn’t guarantee agreement on 
whether” someone knows, for whether we attribute knowledge to someone will depend 
on our plans; the concept of knowledge is thus “plan-laden.” (p. 228) Along similar lines, 
Matthew Chrisman (2007) articulates a “norm-expressivist” account of knowledge 
attributions, on which the attribution of knowledge to S expresses a complex state of 
                                                 
2 We should avoid, if we can, any attempt to define the “cognitive” and the “non-
cognitive.”  Empirical beliefs are paradigm cognitive attitudes; desires are paradigm non-
cognitive attitudes.  
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mind consisting of both (i) the belief that S is entitled by norms e to her true belief that p 
and (ii) the acceptance of those norms (p. 241). 
This is compatible with a plurality of semantic accounts of epistemic discourse.  It is 
compatible with the view, defended by early expressivists, that the sentences involved in 
epistemic discourse are not “truth apt.”  But contemporary expressivists reject this view, 
in favor of the view that the relevant utterances are “truth apt” (Chrisman 2007, p. 237, 
Field 2009, p. 267).  They propose an account on which utterances of such sentences 
express both beliefs (and so are often true) and non-cognitive attitudes; for example, see 
Chrisman’s (i) and (ii), above.3  As Hartry Field (2009, pp. 262-4, pp. 272-8) argues, an 
expressivist account of epistemic discourse could be articulated by appeal to John 
MacFarlane’s (2005a, 2005b) notion of “assessment sensitivity,” with differences in 
assessor’s accepted epistemic norms making for differences in relative truth, such that 
the proposition that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue might be true as assessed 
relative to my preferred epistemic norms, but not true as assessed relative to your 
preferred epistemic norms.  Finally, the “truth aptness” of epistemic evaluation could be 
secured by embracing a “quasi-realist” approach to truth (Gibbard 2003, pp. 18-20, pp. 
180-4).   
There are also various ways for the expressivist to explain the existence of disagreement 
in epistemic discourse.  On Chrisman’s (2007) view, for example, to attribute knowledge 
to S is to express your belief in the proposition that S is entitled by norms e to her true 
belief that p, so disagreement about whether someone knows something might just come 
down to old-fashioned cognitive disagreement about the truth of that proposition.  
However, this isn’t the end of the story: 
[T]he norm-expressivist can also recognize that different utterances can 
express the acceptance of opposing or concurring norms.  Thus … two 
[normative] claims can express genuine opposition or agreement even if 
they do not express logically contradictory or identical propositions. (p. 
239)  
We may agree that norms e entitle someone to believe that p, but since I accept, and you 
do not accept, those norms, we disagree about whether she ought to believe that p.   
Alternatively, if we follow Field (2009) in articulating expressivism in terms of 
assessment sensitivity, then you and I might disagree about the proposition that S ought 
to believe that p – since this proposition is true, relative to the norms that I accept, but 
not true, relative the norms that you accept.   
Expressivism jibes with (although it does not entail) anti-realism about epistemic 
normativity (§1).  Gibbard (1990) writes that his “analysis is not directly of what it is for 
something to be rational, but of what it is for someone to judge that something is 
rational,” (p. 8, cf. p. 46) and that on his view “apparent normative facts” are “no real 
facts at all; instead there [are] facts of what we are doing when we make normative 
judgments.” (p. 23)4  This is why the expressivist can be said to “change the question” 
from that of the nature of goodness and of the definition of ‘good’, to the question of 
“what states of mind ethical statements express.” (2003, p. 6) This is why Gibbard can 
“weasel” (2003, p. 182) about the existence of normative properties, facts, and truths: 
                                                 
3 N.b. that the belief and non-cognitive attitude expressed need not be understood as 
distinct mental states; they could be understood as aspects of one complex mental state 
(cf. Chrisman 2007).   
4 Although compare his “quasi-realism” (2003, pp. 18-20, pp. 180-4). 
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because his account of normative thought and talk is free of commitment to the 
existence of normative properties, facts, and truths.  As Chrisman (forthcoming) 
explains, expressivism about epistemic discourse is a “metaepistemological” view about 
“what it means to claim that a belief is justified, rational, known, etc.,” rather than a 
“normative epistemological” view about what it is for a belief to be justified, rational, 
known, etc.  This is all good news, from the perspective of anti-realism.   
How should the expressivist explain the appropriateness of epistemic discourse, in a way 
that is consistent with philosophical naturalism (cf. §1)?  Gibbard (1990) suggests an 
evolutionary account: “Humanity evolved in groups,” (p. 24) he writes; “we are, in effect, 
designed for social life,” and “[o]ur normative capacities are part of the design.” (p. 26) 
The crucial idea here is that of “the need for complex coordination” (ibid.) among 
human beings.  But natural history might only take us so far: it might explain why we 
engage in epistemic discourse, without explaining why epistemic discourse is appropriate.  
Some naturalists might want to stop there.  But we can, if we are comfortable, go further, 
by adopting a social-functional account of the value of epistemic discourse (Craig 1990, 
Williams 2002, Dogramaci forthcoming).  “Knowledge attributions,” Chrisman (2007) 
writes, “could be seen as playing a crucial role in keeping track of who can be trusted 
about which kinds of information.” (p. 242-3) For these (and other) reasons, “treating a 
belief as a known belief is beneficial in the right sort of circumstances,” (Kappel 2010, p. 
184) and in connection with this we might “debate norms by debating whether they are 
likely to lead to desirable results – in particular, truth-oriented results of various sorts.” 
(Field 2009, p. 278)  But we must be careful here: the anti-realist about epistemic 
normativity can say that epistemic discourse is good because engaging in this practice is 
beneficial or useful or socially desirable; but she must be careful not to appeal to the 
epistemic value of true belief, for example, in her account of the appropriateness of 
epistemic evaluation.  The anti-realist can say that not adopting these policies would lead 
to “things that we … dislike” (Field 2009, p. 256); she can’t say that not adopting these 
policies would be epistemically bad in virtue of the epistemic value of truth (cf. p. 260).5    
2.2 Convention-relativism about epistemic discourse  
That’s expressivism about epistemic discourse (§2.1).  But there’s an (anti-realist) 
alternative to expressivism.6  Consider Ernie Sosa’s (2007) idea of an “insulated critical 
domain,” which is “a set of interrelated entities evaluable through correspondingly 
interrelated values.” (p. 73) Sosa asks us to: 
Consider the world of coffee – of its production, elaboration, and 
consumption.  One central value organizes the critical assessment 
                                                 
5 Consider also an inferentialist semantics for epistemic discourse (Chrisman 2011), 
which appeals to “the distinctively practical kinds of inferential relations in which … 
normative [epistemic] concepts are caught up.” (p. 123) On such a view, for example, we 
might say that <S knows that p> has the following “practical implications”: “I shall act 
as if p is true” and “I shall stop enquiring as to whether p.” (Ibid.) This jibes with a 
social-functional vindication of epistemic evaluation, on which there are “good pragmatic 
reasons to explain why it is better to use concepts embodying these inferential roles 
rather than some other concepts,” thus establishing “our unconditional right to use 
[these] concepts.” (p. 128)  
6 And surely more than one.  Error theory about epistemic discourse has attracted a few 
detractors (Cuneo 2007, Chapter 4, Lynch 2009a, p. 232) but no explicit defenders 
(although Olson 2011 offers a critique of the detractors).   
 6 
distinctive of that domain.  I mean the value of liquid coffee that is 
delicious and aromatic.  Think of the assessment of coffee beans, fields, 
coffee machines, baristas, ways of making liquid coffee, plantations, 
harvests, etc.  What organizes all such evaluation, the value at the 
center of it all, from which the other relevant values are derivative, is 
the value of good coffee, of liquid coffee that is delicious and aromatic. 
(Ibid.)  
Various things – cups of coffee, fields of coffee beans, methods of making coffee – can 
be evaluated relative to the central organizing value of delicious and aromatic liquid 
coffee.  And, as Sosa argues, we might understand epistemology as a critical domain of 
this kind, organized around the central organizing value of true belief (ibid.).  To say that 
x is epistemically good, or good from the epistemic point of view, on Sosa’s view, is to 
say that x does well vis-à-vis the central organizing value of the critical domain of the 
epistemic, namely, true belief, just as to say that x is good from the perspective of the 
world of coffee is to say that x does well vis-à-vis the central organizing value of the 
critical domain of the world of coffee, namely, delicious and aromatic liquid coffee. 
So far this is consistent with expressivism about epistemic discourse: we could 
understand an utterance of <x is epistemically valuable> (for example) as expressing 
both (i) the belief that x does well vis-à-vis the central organizing value of the critical 
domain of the epistemic and (ii) endorsement, acceptance, approval, or valuation of that 
central organizing value (viz. true belief).  However, Sosa rejects such an account, since 
critical evaluation does not require the recognition of any “domain-transcendent value”: 
[S]omeone knowledgeable about guns and their use for hunting, for 
military ends, and so on, may undergo a conversion that makes the use 
of guns abhorrent.  The good shot is thus drained of any real value that 
he can discern.  Nevertheless, his critical judgment within that domain 
may outstrip anyone else’s, whether gun lover or not.  Critical domains 
can be viewed as thus insulated. (pp. 73-4) 
The critic of guns can describe the Smith and Wesson .44 Magnum as “an excellent 
gun,” without expressing her endorsement, acceptance, approval, or valuation of the 
central organizing value of the world of guns – namely, as Harry Callahan articulates it, 
that of blowing people’s heads clean off.  Gun evaluation does not necessarily express 
any non-cognitive attitude towards the central organizing value of the world of guns.  
Likewise, for Sosa, epistemic evaluation does not necessarily express any non-cognitive 
attitudes towards the central organizing value of the critical domain of the epistemic.  
The central organizing value, relative to which evaluation within a critical domain 
operates, is not necessarily something that the evaluator values. 
What then makes true belief the central organizing value of the critical domain of the 
epistemic?  What explains the fact that true belief is the central organizing value of this 
domain?  On Sosa’s view, not the value of true belief: 
Our present worry abstracts from such Platonic issues of epistemic 
normativity.  Truth may or may not be intrinsically valuable absolutely, 
who knows?  Our worry requires only that we consider truth the 
epistemically fundamental value. (Sosa 2007, p. 72)  
But if it is not the value of true belief that explains its status, as the central organizing 
value of the critical domain of the epistemic, what explain its status?   
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“Convention-relativism about epistemic discourse” (more on which below) says: 
convention.  What makes one thing, rather than another, the central organizing value of 
the critical domain of the epistemic is a matter of what we mean by “epistemic.”  
Because “epistemic” is a term of art, employed by academic theorists rather than 
ordinary speakers (contrast “moral” and “aesthetic”), the relevant conventions supervene 
on the historical and contemporary practices of the relevant theorists – the ones who use 
the term “epistemic.”7  True belief, on Sosa’s view, is the central organizing value of the 
critical domain of the epistemic.  The conventionalist need not make this assumption.  
The conventionalist should define “epistemic” so as to capture, as best as possible, the 
use of this term by the relevant theorists.  Given this criterion of adequacy, we should 
adopt a broader conception of the epistemic: the central organizing value of the critical 
domain of the epistemic is “cognitive contact with reality” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 167) or 
accuracy (Grimm and Ahlstrom forthcoming).  True belief is a paradigm species of this, 
but the present formulation leaves open other possible species of cognitive contact with 
reality, such as understanding (Zagzebski 2001, Grimm and Ahlstrom forthcoming), 
“carving nature at the joints” (Sider 2009, 2011, Treanor forthcoming, Hazlett 
unpublished), having fitting or appropriate emotions (Nussbaum 2001, Price 2006), 
perceptual acquaintance with the intrinsic properties of external things (Johnston 1996), 
or knowledge of intrinsic properties (Langton 1998, Lewis 2008).8  But nothing here will 
ride on the assumption of accuracy as the central organizing value of the epistemic. 
Although Sosa suggests the individuation of critical domains in terms of “values,” we 
could just as easily describe a critical domain by articulating a set of rules (e.g. principles 
of evidence), where following the rules is understood as the central organizing “value” of 
that domain.  And we need not understand critical domains as defined by one central 
organizing value; a critical domain might be defined by a plurality of central organizing 
values.  Finally, although Sosa speaks of evaluation relative to a central organizing value, 
nothing stands in the way of speaking of normative discourse more broadly, including 
“ought” claims: we can say that, from the perspective of the world of coffee, one ought 
not use a sock as a filter; and we can say that, from the epistemic perspective, one ought 
to cleave to one’s evidence. 
According to convention-relativism about epistemic discourse, then, the utterance of 
the sentences involved in epistemic discourse express beliefs about how things stand 
relative to the central organizing value (or values) of the critical domain of the epistemic, 
and, moreover, the utterance of such sentences does not necessarily express non-
cognitive attitudes (towards the central organizing value (or values) of the critical domain 
of the epistemic).  Such expression is no part of the conventional meaning of the 
relevant sentences, although this doesn’t mean that epistemic discourse dosen’t, in some 
                                                 
7 The Oxford English Dictionary, noting that it is a philosophical term, defines “epistemic” 
as follows: “Of or relating to knowledge or degree of acceptance.”  The three listed uses 
are from academic philosophy: from a book on logic, from an issue of Mind, and from a 
book on Mill.  The earliest use listed is from 1922.  Compare “moral” (not marked as 
philosophical, first listed use 1387) and “aesthetic” (non-philosophical meanings given, 
first listed use 1764).     
8 A further wrinkle will be required to distinguish the epistemic from the moral or ethical 
(Hazlett 2012, 2013, ): we shall have to individuate critical domains in terms of what they 
take to have final and intrinsic value.  Accuracy is taken, from the epistemic point of view, 
to have final and intrinsic value; this is compatible with the idea that accuracy has final 
constitutive value (Zagzebski 2004, Greco 2010, Baril 2010), from the moral or ethical 
point of view.   
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cases, express non-cognitive attitudes (§3.2);  it only means that such expression isn’t 
built into the meaning of the sentences uttered in epistemic discourse.  This distinguishes 
convention-relativism from expressivism about epistemic discourse (§2.1).  On 
Chrisman’s (2007) view, to say that S knows that p is to express the belief that S is 
entitled by norms e to her true belief that p (p. 241), and on Field’s (2009) view, to 
evaluate something positively in epistemic evaluation is to think or say that that it does 
well vis-à-vis some set of norms (pp. 258-61).  But expressivists will insist that this does 
not yet capture the essence of epistemic discourse: we must add that epistemic evaluation 
and epistemic reasons attribution express non-cognitive attitudes as well.  For Chrisman, 
to say that S knows that p is also to express acceptance of the relevant norms (op. cit.), 
and for Field, in epistemic evaluation, the set of norms in question must be preferences 
that the speaker has or policies that she endorses (op. cit., p. 274).  What distinguishes 
convention-relativism from expressivism is that the conventionalist rejects the view that 
a non-cognitive attitude is necessarily expressed in epistemic discourse.   
This also distinguishes convention-relativism from what Paul Boghossian (2006) calls 
“epistemic relativism” (pp. 84-5, see also Kalderon 2009), on which judgments of 
justification commit one to accepting a particular “epistemic system.”  On convention-
relativism, epistemic discourse involves no such commitment.   
Convention-relativism is a metaepistemological view about epistemic discourse.  Issues 
of metaepistemology are orthogonal to issues in first-order normative epistemology, 
e.g. about the nature of epistemic justification or the status of various character traits as 
epistemic virtues.  Consider, for another example, what Roger White (2007) calls 
“epistemic subjectivism”: the view that “what I (epistemically) ought to believe depends 
on which epistemic rules I happen to adopt.” (p. 117) Convention-relativism is 
orthogonal to this.  
My formulation of convention-relativism is intentionally vague in referring to beliefs 
“about how things stand relative to” some value or values.  (Above we spoke of “doing 
well vis-à-vis” some value.)  This is compatible with a plurality of more specific ways of 
spelling out the content of the beliefs expressed in the various species of epistemic 
discourse.  For example, you might opt for an individualistic teleological account of 
attributions of epistemic virtue, on which <x is an epistemic virtue> is true iff having x 
tends to promote one’s share of accuracy.  This might be adopted for other species of 
epistemic discourse, e.g. attributions of epistemic obligation: <S ought to believe that p> 
is true iff believing that p will promote S’s share of accuracy.  These formulations are 
rough and surely would need refinement.  And there are myriad alternatives to these, 
even given the assumption that accuracy is the central organizing value of the critical 
domain of the epistemic.  For example, we might adopt a social teleological account 
on which e.g. <x is an epistemic virtue> is true iff having x tends to promote people’s 
shares, in general, of accuracy.  Or we might adopt an intentional account on which 
e.g. <x is an epistemic virtue> is true iff having x essentially requires desiring accuracy.  
If we drop our assumption that accuracy is the central organizing value of the critical 
domain of the epistemic, even more options are available.  Suppose that central 
organizing value of the critical domain of the epistemic is the following “evidentialist 
rule”: “It is wrong to believe on insufficient evidence.”  We could then adopt a rule-
following account on which e.g. <S ought to believe that p> is true iff S’s believing that 
p is an instance of following the evidentialist rule.   
We can compare epistemic discourse, on convention-relativist, with another case of 
normative discourse relative to a set of conventions: criticism relative to the rules of a 
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club.  Suppose that Plantation Club rules strictly forbid the eating of peas with a spoon.  
The prohibition of eating peas with a spoon makes it possible to criticize people’s 
behavior, relative to that rule.  The sentence “It’s wrong to eat peas with a spoon, relative 
to the rules of the Plantation Club” is true iff eating peas with a spoon is forbidden by 
the rules of the Plantation Club.  The truth of this sentence is determined entirely by the 
conventional rules of the Plantation Club.  The conventionalist says the same, mutatis 
mutandis, about epistemic discourse.  The truth of the sentence “True belief is 
epistemically valuable,” for example, is determined entirely by the conventional meaning 
of “epistemic.”  Saying that true belief is epistemically valuable, on the conventionalist 
view, is in this respect akin to saying that it’s wrong to eat peas with a spoon, relative to 
the rules of the Plantation Club.   
For this reason, convention-relativism about epistemic discourse jibes with anti-realism 
about epistemic normativity (§1).  Critical domains are “insulated” and free from 
commitment to the “real” existence of the relevant values.  To say that true belief is 
epistemically valuable is not to say anything about the worth of the central organizing 
value of the critical domain of the epistemic, just as to say that it’s wrong to eat peas with 
a spoon, relative to the rules of the Plantation Club, is not to say anything about the 
worth of the Plantation Club’s rule against eating peas with a spoon.  However, 
convention-relativism about epistemic discourse is consistent with, and can explain, the 
fact that epistemic normativity is inescapable, in Philippa Foot’s (1972) sense: both 
morality and etiquette “are inescapable in that behavior does not cease to offend against 
either morality or etiquette because the agent is indifferent to their purposes and to the 
disapproval he will incur by flouting them.” (p. 311) Just as someone’s eating peas with a 
spoon violates the rules of Plantation Club, regardless of her interests or desires, so 
someone can violate her “epistemic obligations” (for example), regardless of her interests 
or desires.9 
As well, convention-relativism can explain the existence of disagreement in epistemic 
discourse.  We might disagree, for example, about whether some character trait really 
does promote one’s share of accuracy.  Convention-relativism is not equivalent to a form 
of speaker relativism on which to say that some belief is epistemically justified is to say 
that it does well relative to the speaker’s standards or values (or relative to what the speaker 
takes the central epistemic value(s) to be).  Such a view would have trouble making sense 
of disagreement in epistemic discourse (cf. Chrisman 2007, p. 234).  Convention-
relativism posits an absolute, non-speaker-relative meaning of “epistemic,” thus allowing 
for the possibility of disagreement.  (This makes for another difference between 
convention-relativism and Boghossian’s “epistemic relativism.”)  As well, it might be 
unclear what the rules of the Plantation Club are; we might disagree about that.  
Likewise, it might be unclear what the central organizing value or values of the critical 
domain of the epistemic are, and we might disagree about that – about the meaning of 
“epistemic.”  It might also be unclear how the central organizing values of a critical 
domain are to be weighted, and we might disagree about that.  Finally, we might debate 
whether the rules of the Plantation Club ought to be changed, or whether we ought to 
adopt a new set of rules.  Likewise for the meaning of “epistemic.”  But once we have 
established what the rules of the Plantation Club are, there is no further question of 
whether those are “really” the rules of the Plantation Club.  Likewise, once we have 
established what the central organizing value (or values) of the critical domain of the 
epistemic are, there is no further question of whether those are “really” the epistemic 
values. 
                                                 
9 This is the reason that teleological accounts of epistemic normativity fail (§1).   
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The comparison to club rules may suggest that epistemic discourse is capricious or 
arbitrary, and thus might suggest that epistemic discourse is somehow groundless and 
unjustified.  But the comparison shouldn’t put us off: the Plantation Club might have 
good reasons for adopting the rules that it does, including rules that may, in some 
important sense, be arbitrary.  The conventionalist, in other words, is in no worse a 
position than any other anti-realist about epistemic normativity, when it comes to 
explaining the appropriateness of epistemic discourse (cf. §2.1).  Alternatively, she might 
offer something more modest.  Consider, again, the rules of the Plantation Club.  Why 
follow these rules?  One might appeal to the benefits of membership and to the fact that 
following these rules is necessary to remain a member.  But one might also simply say 
that these are the rules that we members of the Plantation Club choose to follow.  Why 
not eat peas with a spoon?  Because it disgusts us, or offends us, or pains us, to see peas 
eaten with a spoon – or because we simply don’t like it.  The same might explain the 
appropriateness of epistemic evaluation, as Fred Dretske (2000) argues: 
The only fault with fallacious reasoning, the only thing wrong or bad about 
mistaken  judgments, is that, generally speaking, we don’t like them.  […] 
This … leaves the normativity of false belief and fallacious reasoning in 
the same place as the normativity of foul weather and bad table manners 
– in the attitudes, purposes, and beliefs of the people who make 
judgments about the weather and table behavior. (p. 248) 
So much for the articulation of convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.  Why 
adopt the view?  
3  In defense of convention-relativism 
In this section I present an argument for convention-relativism (§3.1), offer an account 
of the apparent normativity of epistemic discourse (§3.2), and discuss two objections to 
my argument (§3.3 and §3.4).   
3.1 The reverse open question argument 
You might think that epistemic discourse not only appears normative, as I said above, 
but is normative.  As Hartry Field (2009) argues: 
In an evaluative claim … one doesn’t intend to be making a claim about 
a specific norm … [A] claim about what is  justified according to a specific 
norm would be straightforwardly factual, with no evaluative force.  (It 
would encourage the Moore-like response “Sure that’s justified according 
to that norm; but is it justified?”) (pp. 251-2; cf. Gibbard 2003, p. 33, and 
Blackburn 1998, pp. 69-70) 
And you might go on to argue that convention-relativism entails that epistemic discourse 
is not normative.  Convention-relativism (§2.2) seems to treat epistemic discourse as 
involving the utterance of “straightforwardly factual” sentences10 about how things stand 
relative to a conventional value (or set of values).  To say that it’s wrong to eat peas with 
a spoon, relative to the rules of the Plantation Club, isn’t to say that it really is wrong to 
                                                 
10 That is to say, it treats epistemic discourse as involving the utterance of sentences that 
are “straightforwardly factual” according to the correct semantic account of them, the 
truth of which account may not be straightforward. 
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eat peas with a spoon, and, for the convention-relativist, to say that true belief is 
epistemically valuable (for example) isn’t to say that true belief really is valuable.11   
Field (op. cit.) suggests that the claim that x is justified according to a specific norm is not 
normative if it invites – allows the coherent articulation of – the question of whether x 
really is justified.  There is a normative question – whether x really is justified – 
associated with the would-be normative claim – that x is justified according to a specific 
norm – such that the claim is a genuine normative claim only if it does not allow the 
coherent articulation of the corresponding normative question.  We can adapt this 
criterion of normativity (for claims) to our three species of epistemic discourse:  
i. The claim that x is a epistemic virtue is normative only if it does not allow 
the coherent articulation of the question of whether x really is a virtue.   
ii. The claim that x is epistemically valuable is normative only if it does not 
allow the coherent articulation of the question of whether x really is valuable.   
iii. The claim that S epistemically ought to believe that p is normative only if it 
does not allow the coherent articulation of the question of whether S really 
ought to believe that p.   
And let’s assume that epistemic discourse is normative only if these three types of claims 
are normative.  We now must consider two questions: First, does convention-relativism 
imply that epistemic discourse is not normative?  And, second, is epistemic discourse 
normative? 
As I have suggested, it seems that the answer to the first question is Yes.  It is perfectly 
coherent to say that it is wrong to eat peas with a spoon, relative to the rules of the 
Plantation Club, and go on to ask whether it really is wrong.  If epistemic discourse is 
akin to criticism relative to the rules of the Plantation Club, then epistemic discourse is 
not normative.   
What about the second question?  Is epistemic discourse normative?  I think not (cf. 
Fumerton 2001).  The reason is that instances of our three species of epistemic discourse 
do allow the coherent articulation of the corresponding normative question – epistemic 
discourse leaves the relevant normative questions open.  For example: we can grant that 
openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, and still coherently ask whether openmindedness 
really is a virtue; we can grant that true belief is epistemically valuable, and still coherently 
ask whether true belief really is valuable; and we can grant that one epistemically ought to 
cleave to one’s evidence, and still coherently ask whether one really ought to cleave to 
one’s evidence.   
There are two kinds of situations in which these questions can coherently be asked.  The 
first kind of situation is one in which we question the value of accuracy in general.  
Consider Gary, who is an “anti-epistemologist” (cf. Railton 1997, pp. 54-59): he is 
completely indifferent to accuracy – he does not care about true belief, knowledge, 
understanding, etc.  He admits that accuracy is what epistemologists treat as a central 
organizing value.  But he is completely indifferent to accuracy.  He admits that 
openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, that true belief is epistemically valuable, and that 
one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence.  But he still wonders: is 
openmindedness really a virtue?  Is true belief really valuable?  Is it really the case that 
                                                 
11 Convention-relativism has this in common with the view suggested by Mike Ridge 
(2011) on which epistemic evaluation involves attributive uses of “good” and cognate 
expressions.   
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one ought to cleave to one’s evidence?  (Alternatively, we might appeal to the fact that I 
can ask whether epistemic rules or norms are legitimate rules or norms, whether they are 
rules or norms that are worthy of my allegiance, whether I ought to conform my conduct 
to these rules or norms, or not, etc.)12 
The second kind of situation is one in which we question the value of accuracy in 
particular cases.  Imagine that it is true that the number of grains of sand on the beach at 
Coney Island is even.  Assuming that you find the question of the evenness of the 
number of grains of sand on the beach at Coney Island utterly uninteresting, you might 
wonder whether believing this true proposition would have any value, even though you 
concede that it would have some epistemic value, in virtue of being an instance of 
accuracy.  Situations of this kind can also arise when believing as you epistemically ought 
would be disvalauble.  Imagine that Andy has acquired strong, undefeated evidence that 
he will lose his upcoming tennis match with Roger Federer.  He epistemically ought to 
believe that he will lose, but believing this seems disvaluable, given the fact that Andy 
needs confidence and self-belief to even stand a chance against Federer.  It is coherent to 
wonder whether it is really the case that Andy ought, even pro tanto, to believe this 
proposition.     
The upshot of all this is that sometimes accuracy seems, or seems like it may very well 
be, worthless.  In such situations, it becomes coherent to ask the relevant normative 
question, even having conceded the corresponding claim of epistemic discourse.  
Therefore, epistemic discourse is not normative.  Call this the reverse open question 
argument.  
Is it coherent to see accuracy as worthless?  For our purposes we need only show that it 
is coherent to ask whether accuracy is valuable.  But this question can coherently be 
asked, by asking: Should I really care about accuracy?  Is this really worthy of my pursuit?  
Is it, in other words, really good?   
Compare Gibbard’s (1990) critique of the “irrationalist,” who thinks that in many cases 
the rational thing is not what is to be done.  But “[t]he irrationalist cannot be what he 
thinks himself to be, for whatever he endorses he thereby thinks rational.” (pp. 48-9) 
Given this, “what is rational to believe settles what to believe.” (p. 49) But this is not true 
of epistemic rationality: the question of what to believe is left open by a conclusion about 
the requirements of epistemic rationality.  And this is because we can refrain from 
endorsing epistemic value (or epistemic rules or norms).  We might put our point this way: 
we can coherently question the normative force of epistemic value (or of epistemic rules or 
norms).13 “Epistemically good” and “epistemically ought” are different from words like 
“good” and “ought,” sans qualification.  There is an obvious sense in which it is 
incoherent to ask whether the good really is good, or whether one really ought to do 
what one ought to do.  This provides at least one sense in which good-talk and ought-
talk is normative.  But this doesn’t apply, mutatis mutandis, to epistemic discourse.  
Words like “good” and “ought” have normative and non-normative uses.  Consider the 
good assassin (cf. Sosa 2007, Ridge 2011): I can grant that someone is a good assassin, 
while coherently questioning whether she is good.  To say that someone is a good 
                                                 
12 N.b. that the argument here assumes that epistemic normativity is inescapable (§3.1).    
13 What about moral normativity?  Can we coherently question the normative force of 
moral value, or of moral rules or norms?  I leave this question open, but I think there is 
an important difference between “epistemic” and “moral”: the former is a piece of 
philosophical jargon, while the latter is part of ordinary language (cf. §2.2).  
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assassin is just to say that she is a dispassionate and effective killer; we can coherently 
question the value of being a dispassionate and effective killer.  Consider legal obligation: I 
can grant that ing is required by law, while coherently questioning whether I ought to 
.  To say that something is legally obligatory is just to say that it is what the statues 
require; we can legitimacy challenge those requirements.14 
3.2 Explaining the apparent normativity of epistemic discourse 
Gibbard (1990) argues that there is a “special element that makes normative thought and 
language normative,” namely, the fact that such thought and language “involves a kind of 
endorsement – and endorsement that any descriptivistic analysis treats inadequately.” (p. 
33; cf. Blackburn 1998, pp. 69-70)  I have just argued that epistemic discourse is not 
normative (§3.1), but I said about that it appears normative.  What explains the 
appearance?  On my view, epistemic discourse sometimes, but not always involves 
endorsement – it sometimes, but not always, involves the expression of non-cognitive 
attitudes.  That it does explains why epistemic discourse seems normative: we mistake a 
common feature of epistemic discourse for an essential property.  The convention-
relativist account is therefore incomplete until I can explain how, and in what way, 
epistemic discourse sometimes involves the expression of non-cognitive attitudes.   
On my view, the expression of non-cognitive attitudes in epistemic discourse is down to 
pragmatic features of some uses of the sentences involved in epistemic discourse.  This 
contrasts with the expressivist view (§2.1) that such expression is down to semantic 
features of those sentences, i.e. their conventional meanings.  For the expressivist, the 
normativity of epistemic discourse it is down to (semantic) facts about the conventional 
meaning of the relevant sentences; on my view it is down to (pragmatic) facts about some 
uses of those sentences.  Utterances are normative, on my view, not in virtue of the 
meaning of the words or sentences uttered, as on expressivism, but in virtue of pragmatic 
facts about the use of those words or sentences.     
Consider utterances of <S epistemically ought not believe that p>.  On my proposal, 
utterances of this sentence will sometimes express criticism of S’s belief.  When they do, 
this will be a matter of conversational implicature.  Suppose it is common ground in 
our conversational context that you and your interlocutors endorse, or value, or are 
simply interested in accuracy (e.g. true belief), and you sincerely utter <S epistemically 
ought not believe that p>.  On the (mutual) assumption that you are being cooperative, 
and in particular on the (mutual) assumption that you are trying to make your 
contribution to our conversation relevant, I can deduce that you intend to express 
criticism of S’s belief – because the claim that S epistemically ought not believe that p is a 
claim about how S’s belief stands relative to accuracy (§2.2).  Your utterance therefore 
expresses criticism of S’s belief (cf. Fumerton 2001, p. 57).  Compare now two 
conversations about Andy’s belief that he will beat Federer: 
                                                 
14 Consider popular theories of epistemic justification, like reliabilism, evidentialism, and 
coherentism.  We can coherently ask whether reliably-formed beliefs, or evidentially well-
founded beliefs, or belief that coheres with a large body of other beliefs, really are 
justified.  These theories of justification leave the corresponding normative question 
open.  You might argue, following Moore’s “open question argument,” that this reveals 
the inadequacy of these theories.  It seems to me that the opposite conclusion should be 
drawn: these are perfectly good epistemological theories; what we should conclude is that 
epistemic discourse isn’t normative. 
 14 
Gamblers: A pair of gamblers are discussing whether to bet against 
Federer.  They are interested in, and only in, the truth about the question 
of whether Federer will lose. They wonder what tennis experts predict 
the outcome of the match will be.  One notes: “Well, Andy believes that 
he will win.  But he epistemically ought not believe that he’ll win.  So we 
shouldn’t take his belief into account.”  
Commentators: A pair of tennis commentators are discussing the 
underdog’s psychology.  They assume Federer will win, and are only 
interested in the phenomenon of confidence and self-belief.  One argues: 
“Sure, Andy epistemically ought not believe that he will win.  But that’s 
no mark against a belief in this situation.  It’s exactly the belief he should 
have, going into a match like this.” 
The gambler’s utterance of “Andy epistemically ought not believe that he will win” 
expresses criticism of Andy’s belief, but the commentator’s utterance expresses no such 
criticism.  Whenever it is common ground that the speakers endorse, or value, or are 
simply interested in accuracy, utterance of the sentences involved in epistemic discourse 
can involve expression of criticism.  But when that is not common ground, no such 
criticism will be expressed.   
The implication passes the so-called “tests” for conversational implicature.  First, it is 
calculable: the second gambler can figure out that the first gambler’s utterance expresses 
criticism of Andy’s belief based on his knowledge of their shared purpose (finding out 
the truth about the outcome of the match) and tacit understanding of the cooperative 
principle.  Second, it is non-detachable: the gambler could just as easily have criticized 
Andy’s belief by saying that it was formed in an unreliable way or by saying that it goes 
against the evidence.  Third, it is cancellable.  That was the upshot of the reverse open 
question argument (§3.1).   
Compare the debate over whether the expressive implications of moral discourse are a 
matter of conversational implicature.  Stephen Finlay (2004, 2005) argues that 
attributions of moral goodness sometimes, but not always, express non-cognitive 
attitudes of approval.  When they do, it is down to conversational implicature (2004, pp. 
217-22, 2005).  The all-important “test” of cancellability is passed by appeal to the 
amoralist, who indifferently attributes moral goodness (2004, p. 209, 2005, p. 15).  The 
view I have proposed is the analogue of Finlay’s view, transposed to the epistemic 
domain.  Subjectivists, cognitivist realists, and expressivists about moral discourse, 
however, will all reject Finlay’s account on the grounds that the normativity of moral 
discourse is down to (semantic) facts about the conventional meaning of the relevant 
sentences.  In this connection, some argue that the expression of non-cognitive attitudes 
in moral discourse is down to conventional implicature (Barker 2000, Copp 2001).  The 
convention-relativist about epistemic discourse can leave these questions about moral 
discourse open (cf. §3.1).  
It is worth pointing out that this account of the expressive implications of epistemic 
discourse could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the expressive implications of other 
species of conventional evaluation, such as evaluation relative to the rules of the 
Plantation Club (§2.2).  Compare two conversations: 
Caught in the act: The President of the Plantation Club looms over an 
offending diner and says, gravely, “Club rules forbid eating peas with a 
spoon.”   
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Rebellion: Wooster tells the diner: “Club rules forbid eating peas with a 
spoon, but damn the rules, do it anyway!” 
The President expresses disapproval of the diner’s behavior; Wooster expresses no such 
disapproval.  The President is criticizing the diner, while Wooster is encouraging her.  
The difference is down to conversational implicature: I know that the President loathes 
violations of the rules of the Plantation Club, and so can deduce that she is trying to 
admonish the diner, while Wooster’s utterance amounts to an explicit cancellation of any 
such implication.  All this, despite the fact that “Club rules forbid eating peas with a 
spoon” is uncontroversially non-normative.     
3.3 Objection: the epistemic as the doxastic 
My argument assumes what we can call an axial conception of the epistemic, where the 
epistemic is characterized in terms of a certain value or values – above (§2.2), I suggested 
accuracy.  The assumption of such a conception seems needed to advance the reverse 
open question argument (§3.1) – it is what allows the coherent articulation, for example, 
of the question of whether what one epistemically ought to believe is what one really 
ought to believe.  This conception jibes with epistemologists’ use of such expressions as 
“epistemic justification” where this is standardly contrasted with “prudential 
justification.”15  On the axial conception, the epistemic essentially contrasts with the 
prudential, the moral, and the aesthetic.  You might object that this conception of the 
epistemic is illegitimate, and offer a doxastic conception of the epistemic, where 
“epistemic” is understood as synonymous with “doxastic” (meaning “of or concerning 
belief”), “intellectual,” or “theoretical.”  This conception jibes with certain uses of 
“epistemic” in philosophy, such as “epistemic agency,” and with the idea that the 
epistemic essentially contrasts with practical.  The doxastic conception of the epistemic is 
a natural assumption for those realists about epistemic normativity who appeal to the 
normativity of belief.  For them, epistemic norms and values can be understood as 
norms and values that flow from the essential nature of belief.  Above I set that view 
aside by appeal to philosophical naturalism (§1).16  
It seems to me that, if we adopt the doxastic conception of the epistemic, then the 
reverse open question argument is unsound.  Consider the thought (cf. §3.1): “Andy 
epistemically ought to believe that p.  But is it really the case that he ought to believe that 
p?”  If “epistemic” means the same as “doxastic,” then it seems that there can be no 
distinction between what someone epistemically ought to believe and what she ought to 
believe.   When we are considering what someone ought to believe, we are already 
considering matters “of or concerning belief,” and so the addition of “epistemically” 
would be redundant, if “epistemic” means the same as “doxastic.”  The same, mutatis 
                                                 
15 Characterizing the epistemic in terms of accuracy also has an etymological virtue: 
“ἐπιστήμη” is best translated with “knowledge” or “understanding.”    
16 There is a way to make the normativity of belief jibe with philosophical naturalism: by 
adopting an anti-realist account of belief attribution (Dennett 1989, Shah and Velleman 
2005, p. 510).  Naturalism loathes categorical normativity, and the normativity of belief, 
we assumed, implies the existence of categorical normativity, wherever belief is to be 
found.  But if belief is not to be found anywhere, then no categorical normativity is 
implied.  And an anti-realist account of belief attribution implies that belief is not to be 
found anywhere: whether something is to be called a “belief” is not ultimately a factual 
matter, but a matter of the attitude one adopts towards it.  I have tacitly assumed realism 
about belief here.   
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mutandis, when it comes to the distinction between what is epistemically valuable and 
what is valuable – or, at least, when it comes to the distinction between a belief’s being 
epistemically valuable and that belief’s being valuable.  The matter is a bit more complex 
when it comes to the notion of an epistemic virtue.  We do, I think, have a notion of an 
“intellectual virtue” where this means, roughly, a “virtue of the mind.”  Intellectual 
virtues, in this sense, are to be contrasted with practical virtues: the former are character 
traits having essentially to do with how one thinks; the latter are character traits having 
essentially to do with how one acts.  Now it seems to me that this distinction is 
problematic: paradigm practical virtues involve thought (e.g. the courageous person is 
aware of the dangers she faces), and paradigm intellectual virtues involve action (e.g. the 
openminded person will allow other people to have their say in conversation).  But we 
can set that issue aside: the doxastic conception of the epistemic yields a coherent notion 
of the epistemic virtues as “virtues of the mind.”  But this is not the same notion of the 
epistemic virtues that we would get were we to assume an axial conception of the 
epistemic, e.g. on which the epistemic is characterized in terms of accuracy.  That would 
yield a notion of the epistemic virtues as (say) those character traits conducive to 
accuracy (cf. §2.2).  And to assume a priori that “virtues of the mind” are necessarily 
character traits conducive to cognitive contact with reality is to illegitimately conflate two 
different conceptions of the epistemic.  In any event, we can see that the assumption of 
the doxastic conception of the epistemic undermines the distinction between an 
epistemic virtue, i.e. a “virtue of the mind,” and a virtue: for a virtue of the mind is ipso 
facto a virtue.  And so the reverse open question argument is unsound, if we adopt the 
doxastic conception.     
There is no disagreement between the doxastic conception of the epistemic and an axial 
conception – these are just two different sense of “epistemic.”  But the doxastic 
conception has some curious consequences.  Imagine that Andy believes, against his 
evidence, that he will beat Federer, providing him with much-needed confidence.  
Intuitively, there is some sense in which this is a good belief.  But it seems that the 
doxastic conception implies that this belief is therefore epistemically good – since we are 
talking about the goodness of a belief.  But this is counterintuitive: a belief formed in the 
face of strong, undefeated contrary evidence is not epistemically good, even if it is (say) 
prudentially good.  Beliefs can be good without being epistemically good.  This suggests 
that there is a coherent distinction between an epistemically valuable belief and a valuable 
belief, and between what one epistemically ought to believe and what one ought to 
believe, and between an epistemic virtue and a virtue.  An axial conception of the 
epistemic can capture these distinctions; it seems to me that the doxastic conception 
cannot.17   
3.4 Objection: epistemic discourse and the reactive attitudes 
Epistemic discourse (§1) seems sometimes to involve reactive attitudes.  Epistemologists 
sometimes speak of “epistemic praise” and “epistemic blame.”  The careful reasoner and 
the honest inquirer sometimes inspire our praise and admiration, while the sloppy 
reasoner and the wishful thinker sometimes inspire our blame and contempt.  If 
epistemic discourse in akin to evaluation relative to the conventional rules of the 
Plantation Club (§3.1), how can these reactive attitudes be justified?  This is 
unproblematic when the subject of our reactive attitudes is someone who endorses or 
values accuracy: we praise her for getting what she wanted, and blame her for failing to 
                                                 
17 My argument here is (especially) controversial.  For more on these issues, see 
Hieronymi 2005, Shah 2006, Reisner 2008, 2009. 
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get what she wanted.  But what about the case in which the subject of our reactive 
attitudes does not endorse or value accuracy?     
As Bernard Williams (1995) notes, an internalist about practical reasons faces a similar 
challenge.  To blame S for ing seems to require thinking that S had reason to  (p. 41).  
But consider now a man who is a “very hard case”: he treats his wife badly, and in 
response to our criticism (“you ought to be nicer to your wife,” “you have a reason to be 
nicer to her, namely, that she’s your wife”) he responds with indifference (“Don’t you 
understand?  I really do not care”).  He has no internal reason to be nicer to his wife, and 
if all reasons are internal reasons (as the internalist claims), then he has no reason to be 
nicer to his wife.  Blaming him for his cruelty, therefore, seems inappropriate, given our 
assumption connecting blame and reasons for action.  Williams articulates two possible 
lines of response for the internalist.  The first appeals to the idea that blame is a 
“proleptic mechanism” (p. 44), such that hard cases may have “a motivation to avoid the 
disapproval of other people,” as part of “a general desire to be ethically well related to 
people they respect.”  In virtue of this: 
[T]he expression of blame serves to indicate the fact that in virtue of 
this, they have a reason to avoid those things they did not have enough 
reason to avoid up to now. (p. 41)   
In blaming the hard case: 
Our thought may … be this: if he were to deliberate again and take into 
consideration all the reasons that might now come more vividly before 
him, we hope he would come to a different conclusion. (p. 42) 
And among his reasons for coming to this different conclusion might be “this very 
blame and the concerns expressed in it.” (Ibid.) The conventionalist about epistemic 
discourse can say something similar about those cases in which epistemic evaluation 
involves reactive attitudes.  When I blame David for believing that there were weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq, I express my hope that he will proceed with more intellectual 
caution in the future, and aim ideally to bring this about, in part, through David’s 
recognition of my disapprobation.  Epistemic blame, I propose, can be understood as a 
“proleptic mechanism”: the expression of disapprobation aimed at epistemically 
improving the offender, through her recognition of said disapprobation.  Epistemic 
blame could serve this proleptic function even when it comes to an epistemic “hard case” 
– i.e. Gary, the anti-epistemologist (§3.1).  Although he is indifferent to accuracy, he 
might not be indifferent to ethical recognition and approval, and might be brought into 
the epistemic fold, so to speak, in response to our blame.   
But what if the anti-epistemologist is indifferent not only to accuracy, but to ethical 
recognition and approval as well?  What if she lacks “any general disposition to respect 
the reactions of other others” (p. 43)?  In this case, and this is Williams’ second line of 
response, blame is once again problematic for the internalist.  But this is as it should be: 
such people we “regard as hopeless or dangerous characters rather than thinking that 
blame is appropriate to them.” (p. 43) And this applies for “epistemic blame” as well.  
The sociopathic anti-epistemologist is not a suitable object for the reactive attitudes; she 
deserves pity, perhaps, but not blame.  Nonetheless, if she fails to cleave to the evidence, 
then she violates her epistemic obligations.  The reactive attitudes are not required for 
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epistemic discourse – this is predicted by convention-relativism, and that convention-
relativism predicts this speaks in its favor.18  
4 Conclusion 
I have motivated anti-realism about epistemic normativity by appeal to philosophical 
naturalism (§1), articulated convention-relativism about epistemic discourse (§2), and 
defended convention-relativism (§3).  The upshot of my argument is that we can concede 
(for example) that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, that true belief is epistemically 
valuable, and that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence, while leaving the 
following normative questions open: 
i. Is openmindedness a virtue? 
ii. Is true belief valuable?19   
iii. Ought one cleave to one’s evidence?     
These are difficult normative questions.  If convention-relativism about epistemic 
discourse is correct, then we are ill-served by focusing on the “epistemic” analogues of 
these questions, at least until we have an adequate answer to the question of the value of 
accuracy.20 
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